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Abstract
We introduce the logics GLPΛ, a generalization of Japaridze’s poly-
modal provability logic GLPω where Λ is any linearly ordered set rep-
resenting a hierarchy of provability operators of increasing strength.
We shall provide a reduction of these logics to GLPω yielding among
other things a finitary proof of the normal form theorem for the variable-
free fragment of GLPΛ and the decidability of GLPΛ for recursive order-
ings Λ. Further, we give a restricted axiomatization of the variable-free
fragment of GLPΛ.
1 Introduction
The provability logic GLPΛ with transfinitely many modalities 〈α〉, for all
ordinals α < Λ, generalizes the well-known provability logic GLP denoted
GLPω in this paper [21, 9]. The logic GLPω has been used to carry out
a proof-theoretic analysis of Peano Arithmetic and related theories using
the approach of provability algebras initiated in [3]. A natural next class
of theories to analyze with this new approach are predicative theories such
as the second order theories of iterated arithmetical comprehension and
ATR0. The first necessary step towards analyzing predicative theories with
provability algebras was made in [4] where logics GLPΛ, for an arbitrary
ordinal Λ, were introduced and it was shown that the variable-free fragments
of these logics yield a natural ordinal notation system up to the ordinal Γ0.
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Assuming an ordinal Λ to be represented, ordinals of a possibly larger
class can be denoted by modal formulas (called words or worms) of the form
〈α1〉〈α2〉 . . . 〈αn〉⊤,
where αi < Λ, identified modulo provable equivalence in GLPΛ. The ordering
between two words A and B is naturally defined by
A <0 B ⇐⇒ GLPΛ ⊢ B → 〈0〉A.
It was shown that this ordering is a well-ordering, and basic formulas for
the computation of the order types of its initial segments in terms of Veblen
ordinal functions were found in [4].
Since then, the logics GLPΛ and their ordinal notation systems have
been studied in much more detail (see [16, 13, 14]). Most importantly,
suitable Kripke models for the variable-free fragment of GLPΛ generalizing
the so-called Ignatiev model for GLPω [20] have been developed. Also, the
completeness of GLPΛ w.r.t. topological semantics has been proved [1, 12].
Some of these papers used the normal form results from [4].
Sections 4 and 5 of the present paper is in many respects a ‘recasting’ of
the part of [4] devoted to the normal forms for the variable-free fragment of
GLPΛ and to its axiomatizations. The main reason to have such a recasting
is that the exposition in [4] was at some places overly sketchy, to the extent
that some parts of the arguments were only hinted at. The main such omis-
sion was the proof of the fact that the ordering <0 on words was irreflexive,
or equivalently the fact that any individual word was consistent with GLPΛ.
Modulo this claim, the rest of the arguments in the paper were purely syn-
tactical or dealt with ordinal computations. For this consistency result one
would naturally use some kind of semantics, which were not available at the
time for Λ > ω (but see [13]).
Another reason for having a recast of parts of [4] is that the authors
of [13] needed certain results –in particular, Corollaries 5.11 and 5.12 of
the current paper – that follow from the line of reasoning presented in [4].
However, a proof of these corollaries could not be given without revisiting
and sharpening various results from [4].
Moreover, it was remarked in [4] that the irreflexivity of <0 follows,
for example, from any arithmetically sound interpretation of GLPΛ w.r.t. a
sequence of strong provability predicates. Indeed, the existence of such in-
terpretations was obvious at least for constructive ordinals Λ. On the other
hand, a proof appealing to such an interpretation is necessarily based on the
assumption of soundness of a fairly strong extension of Peano Arithmetic and
2
thus cannot be formalized in Peano Arithmetic itself. For proof-theoretic
applications we would like to have an ordering representation whose ele-
mentary properties such as irreflexivity are provable by finitary means (e.g.,
in Primitive Recursive Arithmetic). Alternative proofs based on the use of
Ignatiev-like models or topological models for GLPΛ suffer from the same
drawback.
In this paper we remedy this situation and provide a different purely
modal finitary proof of irreflexivity based on a reduction of GLPΛ to GLPω,
for which such a finitary proof is known [2]. We also prove the conservativity
of GLPΛ over any of its restrictions to a subset of modalities. This reduction
uses the methods of [6].
The exposition of the normal form theorem for variable-free formulas in
GLPΛ in this paper is also slightly different from the one in [3, 4]. Namely,
the normal forms are defined in a ‘positive’ way, which helps, in particu-
lar, to eliminate the assumption of irreflexivity at some places where it is
not necessary. Finally, we provide a more restricted axiomatization of the
variable-free fragment of GLPΛ than the one in [4].
An additional novelty of this paper is that the results can be stated and
proved in a more general context of logics with linearly ordered sets of modal-
ities. Thus, from the outset we introduce and work with a generalization of
GLPΛ to the case when Λ is an arbitrary, not necessarily well-founded, linear
ordering. So far, proof-theoretic interpretations of such logics have not been
investigated; however it seems likely that they can appear, for example, in
the study of progressions of theories defined along recursive linear orderings
without infinite hyperarithmetical descending sequences (see, e.g., [11]).
2 The logic GLPΛ and its fragments
In this section we shall introduce the formal systems that we will study
throughout the paper. Our logics depend on a parameter, usually denoted
Λ, which is a linear order of the form 〈|Λ|, <〉. They then contain a modality
[α] for each α ∈ |Λ|. In analogy to the set-theoretic treatment of ordinals,
we will identify Λ with an upper bound for its elements and often write
α < Λ instead of α ∈ |Λ|; elements of |Λ| will sometimes be called modals.
Note, however, that unlike previous studies of GLPΛ, we allow for Λ to be
an arbitrary linear order.
We will also introduce some important fragments of GLPΛ. These frag-
ments are easier to work with from a technical point of view, yet they already
contain much of the crucial information about the full logic, as we shall see.
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2.1 The logics GLPΛ
The full language LΛ is built from propositional variables in a countably
infinite set P and the constant ⊤ together with the Boolean connectives
¬,∧ and a unary modal operator [α] for each α ∈ Λ. As is customary, other
Boolean operators may be defined in the standard way and we write 〈α〉 as
a shorthand for ¬[α]¬.
We will use modφ to denote the set of elements of |Λ| appearing in φ
and maxφ to be the maximum of these modals. We also use l(φ) to denote
the length of φ, defined in a standard way, and w(φ) to be its width, that is,
the number of modals appearing in φ.
Definition 2.1 (GLPΛ). Given a linear order Λ = 〈|Λ|, <〉, GLPΛ is the
logic over LΛ given by the following rules and axioms:
• All substitution instances of propositional tautologies,
• For all α, β ∈ |Λ| and formulas χ,ψ ∈ LΛ,
(i) [α](χ→ ψ)→ ([α]χ→ [α]ψ)
(ii) [α]([α]χ → χ)→ [α]χ
(iii) [α]χ→ [β][α]χ for α ≤ β
(iv) 〈α〉χ→ [β]〈α〉χ for α < β,
(v) [α]χ→ [β]χ for α ≤ β.
• Modus Ponens and the necessitation rule
χ
[α]χ
for each modality α ∈
|Λ|.
This definition contains certain redundancies: Axiom (iii) is clearly
derivable in presence of the others, and necessitation for 0 would suffice
given Axiom (v). However, it will be convenient to state these principles
separately.
2.2 Kripke semantics
Kripke models give us a transparent and convenient interpretation for many
modal logics. A Kripke frame is a structure F =
〈
W, 〈Rλ〉λ<Λ
〉
, where W is
a set and 〈Rλ〉λ<Λ a family of binary relations on W . A valuation on F is a
function J·K : LΛ → P(W ) such that
J⊥K = ∅ J¬φK = W \ JφK
Jφ ∧ ψK = JφK ∩ JψK J〈λ〉φK = R−1λ JφK .
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A Kripke model is a Kripke frame equipped with a valuation J·K. Note
that propositional variables may be assigned arbitrary subsets of W . Often
we will write 〈F, J·K〉 , x  ψ instead of x ∈ JψK or even just x  ψ if the
context allows us to. As usual, φ is satisfied on 〈F, J·K〉 if JφK 6= ∅, and valid
on 〈F, J·K〉 if JφK =W . The latter case shall be denoted by 〈F, J·K〉 |= ψ.
We shall also use the notion of frame validity in that F, x |= ψ denotes
that 〈F, J·K〉 , x  ψ for any valuation J·K. Likewise, F |= ψ denotes that
F, x |= ψ for all x in F.
GLPΛ has no non-trivial Kripke models, but its variable-free or closed
fragment (defined below) does [20]. We will use a sublogic JΛ of GLPΛ
that is sound and complete w.r.t. a suitable class of finite frames called
J-frames. The logics JΛ can be obtained from the given axiomatization
of GLPΛ by replacing the monotonicity axiom schema (v) by the following
schema (derivable in GLPΛ):
[α]φ→ [α][β]φ, for α ≤ β.
This system has been introduced in [6] just for the language Lω. Although
it is easy to see that the Kripke model completeness theorem for Jω proved
in [6] holds more generally, we will actually use it only for the logic Jω.
A Kripke frame is called a JΛ-frame if, for all β < α < Λ,
• Rα is a conversely well-founded, transitive ordering relation on W ;
• ∀x, y (xRαy ⇒ ∀z (xRβz ⇔ yRβz));
• ∀x, y (xRαy & yRβz ⇒ xRαz).
A JΛ-frame is called finite if so is the set of its nodes W . A JΛ-model is a
Kripke model based on a JΛ-frame.
The following is proved in [6] for Λ = ω, but holds more generally with
the same proof.
Proposition 2.2.
1. If JΛ ⊢ φ then φ is valid in all JΛ-models;
2. If JΛ 0 φ then φ is not valid in some finite JΛ-model.
2.3 Fragments of GLPΛ
There are two particular families of sublogics of GLPΛ which we will focus
on later. The first is the fragment without variables, which as we shall see
is already quite expressive:
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Definition 2.3 (Closed fragment). We denote by L0Λ the sublanguage of LΛ
whose formulas do not contain propositional variables (only ⊤).
GLP0Λ denotes the intersection of GLPΛ with L
0
Λ.
That is, GLP0Λ is the set of provable formulas of GLPΛ that do not contain
any propositional variables. It is clear that any closed formula ψ provable
in GLP0Λ can also be proved using proofs and axioms without variables.
For, given a proof π of ψ, we can substitute ⊤ (or ⊥) for the propositional
variables that occur in π. After substitution we still have a proof of ψ.
The second fragment is the restriction to a subset of all modals, which
is especially useful when this subset is finite.
Definition 2.4. For any subset S ⊆ |Λ|, let LS denote the language with
the set of modalities {[ξ] : ξ ∈ S}, and let GLPS be the logic
1 given by the
restriction of the axioms and rules of GLPΛ to LS.
As we shall see in Section 3, any provable formula of LS is also provable
within GLPS . However, this is not as immediate as in the case of the closed
fragment.
3 Reduction of GLPΛ to its finite fragments
Here we show that GLPΛ is conservative over any of its fragments obtained
by restricting the language to a subset of its modalities.
Clearly, if S is a set of ordinals, GLPS is only notationally different from
GLPβ where β is the order type of S. More precisely, let ξα be the α-th
element of S and let ξ(φ) denote the result of replacing in a formula φ (in
the language Lβ) each modality [α] by [ξα]. Similarly, let ξ
−1(ψ) denote the
inverse operation. Then the following lemma is obvious.
Lemma 3.1.
(i) GLPβ ⊢ φ iff GLPS ⊢ ξ(φ);
(ii) GLPS ⊢ ψ iff GLPβ ⊢ ξ
−1(ψ).
The conservation result is now stated as follows.
Theorem 3.2. Given a linear order Λ, S ⊆ |Λ| and a formula φ in LS,
GLPΛ ⊢ φ iff GLPS ⊢ φ.
1In principle we should include Λ as a second parameter since these logics depend on
the specific ordering, but we will let this be given by context.
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Proof. A proof will proceed in two steps. First, we prove the conservativity
of GLPω over any of its finite fragments. Secondly, we will use a purely
syntactic argument to lift this result to arbitrary fragments of GLPΛ.
We are going to use the following standard reduction of GLPω to Jω (see
[6]). Let φ be a GLPω-formula, and let {[mi]φi : i < s} be all the boxed
subformulas of φ with mi ≤ mj whenever i < j. Denote:
M+(φ) := M(φ) ∧
∧
i≤ms
[i]M(φ),
where
M(φ) :=
∧
i<s
∧
mi<j≤ms
([mi]φi → [j]φi).
The following result is proved in [6] using Kripke model techniques. Al-
ternative proofs (using the topological and the arithmetical semantics, re-
spectively) can be found in [8, 1]. The proof in [6] has the advantage of
being formalizable in Elementary Arithmetic.2
Lemma 3.3. GLPω ⊢ φ ⇐⇒ Jω ⊢M
+(φ)→ φ.
We are going to show here that the formula M+ can be replaced by a
formally weaker one: N+(φ) := N(φ) ∧
∧
i<s[mi]N(φ) and
N(φ) :=
∧
i<s
∧
i<j<s
([mi]φi → [mj]φi).
Notice that N+(φ) is in the language of φ.
Lemma 3.4. GLPω ⊢ φ ⇐⇒ Jω ⊢ N
+(φ)→ φ.
Proof. Suppose Jω 0 N
+(φ) → φ. Then there is a finite Jω-model W with
a node r such that W, r  N+(φ) and W, r 1 φ. Replace each relation Rk
in W by ∅, for all k /∈ S := {m0, . . . ,ms−1}. The result is still a Jω-model
(denotedW ′), and the forcing of formulas in the language of φ is everywhere
the same.
Finally, we observe that M+(φ) is true at r. It is sufficient to show
that each implication [mi]φi → [j]φi, for mi < j ≤ ms, holds at each point
x ∈ W ′ reachable from r. We observe that such an x is either r itself or is
reachable by one of the relations Rmi , for i < s. Since r  N(φ)∧ [mi]N(φ)
we have x  N(φ). Hence, if j ∈ S we have x  [mi]φi → [j]φi as required.
However, if j /∈ S the relation Rj is empty, and thus x  [j]φi trivially.
Thus, Lemma 3.4 follows from Lemma 3.3.
2The formula M(φ) is misspelled in [6].
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For any S ⊆ ω let JS denote the restriction of the logic Jω to the language
LS .
Lemma 3.5. For any formula φ in LS, Jω ⊢ φ iff JS ⊢ φ.
Proof. Only the (only if) part needs to be proved. Assume JS 0 φ. Consider
any Jω-model W in the restricted language LS such that W 6|= φ. For each
i /∈ S, define a new relation Ri on W by letting Ri = ∅. The expanded
model W ′ is a model of Jω and W
′ 6|= φ. Hence, Jω 0 φ.
From Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5 we obtain the conservativity of GLPω over its
fragments.
Corollary 3.6. Let S ⊆ ω and φ be a formula in LS. Then GLPω ⊢ φ iff
GLPS ⊢ φ.
Now we turn to the general case and prove Theorem 3.2. Assume φ is in
LS and GLPΛ ⊢ φ. Let R ⊆ |Λ| be the set of all modals occurring in the given
derivation of φ. The same derivation shows that GLPR ⊢ φ. Since R is finite,
we can assume it is enumerated by some function ξ : {0, . . . , n − 1} → R.
Let ψ := ξ−1(φ). By Lemma 3.1 we obtain GLPn ⊢ ψ and hence GLPω ⊢ ψ.
Let F be the set of modals occurring in φ. Obviously, F ⊆ R and
G := ξ−1(F ) ⊆ ω. Therefore, by Corollary 3.6 GLPG ⊢ ψ. It follows that
GLPξG ⊢ ξ(ψ), that is, GLPF ⊢ φ. Since F ⊆ S we conclude that GLPS ⊢ φ,
as required. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.2.
For any formula φ let φˆ denote ξ−1(φ), where ξ : {0, . . . , n − 1} → F
enumerates the set F of all modals occurring in φ. Applying Theorem 3.2
to F we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.7. For any φ, GLPΛ ⊢ φ iff GLPn ⊢ φˆ iff GLPω ⊢ φˆ.
Proof. By Theorem 3.2, GLPΛ ⊢ φ iff GLPF ⊢ φ, whereas by Lemma 3.1 the
latter is equivalent to GLPn ⊢ φˆ.
By this corollary, the logic GLPΛ inherits many nice properties proved
for GLPω. Let us state a few explicitly. Below, the corollaries follow directly
from their counterparts as proven for GLPω [20, 7, 24].
Corollary 3.8. GLPΛ is a decidable logic, provided Λ has a recursive pre-
sentation.
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Corollary 3.9. GLPΛ enjoys Craig interpolation: If ψ(~p, ~q) and φ(~q,~r)
are LΛ-formulas with all variables among the distinct variables ~p, ~q, ~r with
GLPΛ ⊢ ψ(~p, ~q) → φ(~q,~r), then there is some formula θ(~q) whose variables
are all among ~q such that
GLPΛ ⊢
(
ψ(~p, ~q)→ θ(~q)
)
∧
(
θ(~q)→ φ(~q,~r)
)
.
Corollary 3.10. GLPΛ has unique fixpoints: Let ψ(~p, q) be a formula of LΛ
where q only occurs under the scope of a modality. Then, there exists some
φ(~p) such that ψ(~p, q/φ(~p)) is GLPΛ-provably equivalent to φ(~p). Moreover,
this is provable within GLPΛ itself:
GLPΛ ⊢ (q ↔ φ(~p)) ↔ (q ↔ ψ(~p, q)).
The standard variations of this theorem like unique solutions to simul-
taneous fixpoints equations also carry directly through to GLPΛ.
Corollary 3.11. GLPΛ satisfies the uniform interpolation property: for any
LΛ -formula ψ(~q,~r) with distinguished variables ~q there exists a uniform
interpolant, that is, a formula φ(~q) such that for any θ(~q) we have
GLPΛ ⊢ ψ(~q,~r)→ θ(~q) ⇐⇒ GLPΛ ⊢ φ(~q)→ θ(~q).
4 Worms and their normal forms
In this section we study worms, or iterated consistency satements, which in a
sense form the backbone of the logic GLP0Λ (recall that GLP
0
Λ is the fragment
of GLPΛ which contains no propositional variables). Worms directly code the
ordinals needed for a proof-theoretic analysis of formal theories. Moreover,
as we shall see, every closed formula of GLP0Λ can be written as a Boolean
combination of worms.
Many of the results presented here appeared originally in [4]. The main
difference is that we employ a different –but equivalent, as we shall see–
definition of normal forms on worms. We also include more details than in
[4] and do not use the irreflexivity of the <α relations.
Definition 4.1 (Worms). The set of words, or worms, is a subset of L0Λ
denoted by W and is inductively defined as ⊤ ∈W, and A ∈W ⇒ 〈α〉A ∈
W where α is a modal.
We write α ∈ A to indicate that α occurs somewhere in the word A. By
Wα we denote {A ∈W | β ∈ A⇒ β ≥ α}.
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It is customary to identify a worm A with the sequence of the modals in
A. Thus, 〈0〉〈2〉⊤ will be associated with just 02 but we shall also employ
any hybrid form like 〈0〉2, etc. We will associate ⊤ with the empty se-
quence/word ǫ. Worms owe their name to the heroic worm-battle, a variant
of the Hydra battle (see [5]), but they may also be called words.
4.1 Natural orderings on Wα
On the set of worms one can define natural order relations.
Definition 4.2. For A,B ∈W we define A <α B :⇔ GLPΛ ⊢ B → 〈α〉A.
It is clear by Axiom (iii) that <α is transitive for each α and by Axiom
(v), that <β⊆<α for α ≤ β. In [4] it is shown that assuming irreflexivity
for <α, the orderings <α define a well-order order on Wα modulo prov-
able equivalence, provided Λ is itself well-ordered. Thus in this case, given
irreflexivity, the elements of Wα can be associated with ordinals.
The next lemma is the basis of a large portion of our reasoning and we
shall use it in the remainder of this paper without explicit mention.
Lemma 4.3.
1. For closed formulas φ and ψ, if β < α, then
GLPΛ ⊢ (〈α〉φ ∧ 〈β〉ψ)↔ 〈α〉(φ ∧ 〈β〉ψ);
2. For closed formulas φ and ψ, if β < α, then
GLPΛ ⊢ (〈α〉ϕ ∧ [β]ψ)↔ 〈α〉(ϕ ∧ [β]ψ);
3. GLPΛ ⊢ AB → A
4. If A ∈Wα+1, then GLPΛ ⊢ A ∧ 〈α〉B ↔ AαB;
5. If A,B ∈Wα and GLPΛ ⊢ A↔ B, then
GLPΛ ⊢ AαC ↔ BαC.
Proof. For 1, we observe that by Axiom (iv) we have 〈β〉ψ → [α]〈β〉ψ,
whence 〈α〉φ ∧ 〈β〉ψ → 〈α〉(φ ∧ 〈β〉ψ). For the other direction, we note that
〈α〉(φ ∧ 〈β〉ψ)→ 〈α〉〈β〉ψ and the antecedent implies 〈β〉ψ by Axiom (iii).
The proof of 2 is similar. By Axiom (iii) we see that [β]ψ → [α][β]ψ,
whence 〈α〉φ∧ [β]ψ → 〈α〉(φ∧ [β]ψ). For the other direction, we use Axiom
(iv) to get 〈β〉¬ψ → [α]〈β〉¬ψ. Thus,
〈α〉(φ ∧ [β]ψ) ∧ 〈β〉¬ψ → 〈α〉⊥
→ ⊥,
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whence 〈α〉(φ ∧ [β]ψ)→ [β]ψ.
Item 3 is proven by induction on the length of A. For zero length we see
that A = ⊤. For the inductive case we reason in GLPΛ and consider 〈α〉AB.
By a necessitation on the induction hypothesis we get [α](AB → A). Using
Axiom (i), we see that 〈α〉AB ∧ [α](AB → A) → 〈α〉A. We shall later see
that in general 0 AB → B.
Item 4 follows from repeatedly applying 1 (from outside in), and Item 5
follows from Item 4.
Using the <α relation we can define a normal form for worms.
Definition 4.4 (worm normal form). A worm A ∈ W is in WNF (worm
normal form) iff
1. A = ǫ, or
2. A is of the form Akα . . . αA1 with α = min(A), k ≥ 1 and Ai ∈Wα+1
such that each Ai is in WNF and moreover Ai+1 ≤α+1 Ai for each
i < k.
We note that the definition of WNF refers to provability in GLPΛ every
time it states Ai+1 ≤α+1 Ai : recall that the latter is short for GLPΛ ⊢ Ai →
〈α+1〉Ai+1 or GLPΛ ⊢ Ai ↔ Ai+1. In virtue of Theorem 3.2 we can replace
the use of GLPΛ by its relevant fragment of finite signature.
Lemma 4.5. Each worm of width one is in WNF.
Proof. This is immediate if we conceive αn as ǫαǫ . . . ǫαǫ.
We emphasize that WNFs on worms are rather similar in form to Cantor
normal forms (CNF) with base ω on ordinals. A notable difference is that
where ordinals in CNF have their largest terms on the left-hand side, worms
have their largest “term” on the right-hand side.
Lemma 4.6 below tells us that, in order to compare two worms in WNF it
suffices to compare, just as with CNFs, the largest non-equal components.
As a slight abuse of notation, we will often write a worm A in the form
Akα . . . A1, with the understanding that A = ǫ when k = 0 and A = A1
when k = 1.
Lemma 4.6. Let A = Akα . . . A1αA
′ be in WNF with α = min(A), and
each Ai ∈Wα+1. Moreover, let B be in WNF. We have that
if A′ <α+1 B, then A <α+1 B.
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Proof. By induction on k. We write A as AkαC. As AkαC is in WNF and
α = min(A), we see that necessarily C is of the form DαE with D ∈Wα+1
and the αE part possibly empty. By the IH (or by assumption in case
k = 0), we see that C <α+1 B, from which we obtain
B → 〈α+ 1〉C
→ 〈α+ 1〉(DαE)
→ 〈α+ 1〉D ∧ 〈α+ 1〉C as D ≥α+1 Ak
→ 〈α+ 1〉Ak ∧ 〈α+ 1〉C
→ 〈α+ 1〉Ak ∧ 〈α〉C
→ 〈α+ 1〉AkαC.
In other words, AkαC <α+1 B and we are done. Note that the proof also
works for A′ = ǫ in which case A is just of the form αm for some m ∈ ω.
Let us introduce some special notation for worms in WNF.
Definition 4.7. We denote Wα ∩ WNF by W
◦
α.
Lemma 4.8. For all A,B ∈W◦α, either A = B, A <α B or B <α A.
Proof. We may assume that α ∈ AB. For if this were not the case, we
prove the lemma for A,B ∈Wβ where β = min(A,B) and see that GLPΛ ⊢
A → 〈β〉B implies GLPΛ ⊢ A → 〈α〉B. In case β does not exist we have
AB = A = B = ǫ.
We will prove the lemma by induction on w(AB). Recall that by our
convention, Akα . . . A1αA
′ should be understood to denote A′ for k = 0 and
A1αA
′ for k = 1.
For w(AB) ≤ 1 and A 6= B we see that l(A) < l(B) ⇒ A <α B thus
obtaining our result as either l(A) < l(B) or l(B) < l(A).
We now consider w(AB) > 1. Suppose that A 6= B. We may assume
that none of A or B is a proper extension of the other, for if, for example,
B were a proper extension of A, then A <α B by Axiom (iii). Thus, we
write A = Akα . . . Anα . . . A1 and B = Bmα . . . Bnα . . . B1 where n is the
smallest number such that An 6= Bn. By the IH we may, w.l.o.g. assume
that An <α+1 Bn. Reasoning in GLPΛwe see that
Bn → 〈α + 1〉An ⇒ Bn ∧ α . . . B1 → 〈α+ 1〉An ∧ α . . . A1
⇒ Bnα . . . B1 → 〈α+ 1〉(Anα . . . A1).
By Lemma 4.6 we conclude that A <α+1 Bnα . . . B1. As clearly Bnα . . . B1 ≤α
B we obtain A <α B as desired.
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Note that it is necessary to require that A,B ∈Wα in the above lemma:
as we shall see, the normal forms 1 and 01 are <1-incomparable. It is easy to
see that the proof of the lemma automatically yields the following corollary.
Corollary 4.9. Consider two worms A = Amα . . . αA1 and B = Bnα . . . αB1
both in W◦α with Ai, Bj ∈ W
◦
α+1, and not all the Ai nor all the Bj empty.
Let <Lα+1 denote the lexicographical ordering on finite strings over Wα+1
induced by <α+1. We have that
A <α B ⇔ (A1, . . . , Am) <
L
α+1 (B1, . . . , Bn).
The above considerations are sufficient to give an effective procedure for
deciding the ordering on worms, provided we have a procedure for ordering
Λ.
Definition 4.10. We call a procedure Λ-effective if it is effective using an
oracle for deciding α < β for α, β ∈ |Λ|.
Corollary 4.11. There is a Λ-effective procedure that compares two worms
in W◦α.
Proof. The Λ-effective decision procedure is already present in the proof. For
w(AB) ≤ 1 deciding whether A <α B amounts to counting and comparing
the number of symbols in A and B. For w(AB) > 1 this amounts to checking
for first checking equality. This we can do, as we can pose oracle queries
on elements in the 〈|Λ|, <〉 ordering. If A 6= B, we look at the first (from
the right) non-equal term in A and B and recursively call upon our decision
procedure. Note that in this case l(AB) will diminish so we have an effective
bound on the amount of calls on the decision procedure.
Next we formulate an obvious corollary to lemma 4.8 that will be very
useful later on.
Corollary 4.12. For each A,B ∈W◦α, either GLPΛ ⊢ αA→ αB, or GLPΛ ⊢
αB → αA.
Proof. All implications in this proof refer to implications inside GLPΛ. By
Lemma 4.8 we have A ≤α B or B <α A. If A = B the implication is clearly
provable. If A <α B, then B → αA whence αB → ααA, and αB → αA.
Likewise, B <α A implies αB → αA.
Corollary 4.13. Given worms A,B ∈ W◦α, there is a worm C ∈ Wα with
GLPΛ ⊢ A ∧ B ↔ C. Moreover, we have that mod(C) ⊆ mod(AB), and
l(C) ≤ l(AB).
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Proof. By induction on w(AB). The base case is trivial. For the inductive
case, we assume w.l.o.g. that α ∈ AB and write A = A1αA2 and B = B1αB2
with at most one of αA2, αB2 empty and A1, B1 ∈ W
◦
α+1. We reason in
GLPΛ. By the IH, we find some C1 ↔ A1 ∧ B1. By Corollary 4.12 we may
assume that αA2 → αB2. Thus, we conclude the proof by
A ∧B ↔ A1αA2 ∧B1αB2
↔ A1 ∧ αA2 ∧B1 ∧ αB2
↔ A1 ∧B1 ∧ αA2 ∧ αB2
↔ C1 ∧ αA2 ∧ αB2
↔ C1 ∧ αA2
↔ C1αA2
Corollary 4.14. There is a Λ-effective procedure which, given two worms
A and B in WNF, computes a worm C so that GLPΛ ⊢ A ∧ B ↔ C with
mod(C) ⊆ mod(AB), and l(C) ≤ l(AB).
Proof. The proof of Lemma 4.13 contains a decision procedure. For w(AB) ≤
1 computing the conjunction just amounts to taking the longer of A or B.
For w(AB) > 1 we compute C as dictated by the proof of Lemma 4.13
where we use Corollary 4.11 to decide which of αA2 → αB2 or αB2 → αA2
is the case.
In Lemma 4.8 we have proved that <α defines a linear order on the set
of normal forms of Wα. We shall next see through a series of lemmata that
each worm A is equivalent in GLPΛ to one in WNF. Thus, we can drop the
condition of worms being in WNF in various lemmata above (4.8, 4.12, and
4.13).
Lemma 4.15. For non-empty A ∈Wα+1 we have for any B ∈W that
GLPΛ ⊢ AαB ↔ Aα
nB for n ∈ ω \ {0}.
Proof. By an easy induction on n.
Lemma 4.16. Let A := A1αA0B with (B = ǫ or B = αA
′) and each of
A1, A0 in Wα+1.
If GLPΛ ⊢ A1 → 〈α+ 1〉A0, then GLPΛ ⊢ A↔ A1B.
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Proof. We assume GLPΛ ⊢ A1 → 〈α + 1〉A0. (The first direction actually
holds without the assumption.)
From A1αA0B we get A1 ∧ A0B. If B is of the form αA
′, from αA0B
we get B by repeatedly applying Axiom (iii) from inside out. When B = ǫ,
we have B straight away of course. Thus,
GLPΛ ⊢ A → A1 ∧ αA0B
→ A1 ∧B
→ A1B.
For the other direction we reason in GLPΛ and use our assumption that
A1 → 〈α+ 1〉A0.
A1B → A1B ∧ 〈α+ 1〉A0
→ A1 ∧B ∧ 〈α+ 1〉A0
→ A1 ∧ 〈α+ 1〉A0B
→ A1 ∧ 〈α〉A0B
→ A1αA0B.
Lemma 4.17. Each worm A ∈W is equivalent in GLPΛ to some NF(A) in
WNF. Moreover, mod(NF(A)) ⊆ mod(A).
Proof. By induction on l(A) we shall prove that each A ∈Wα is equivalent
to some C ∈Wα with l(C) ≤ l(A) and mod(C) ⊆ mod(A). For l(A) = 0 we
see that A = ǫ ∈ WNF. We proceed to prove the case when l(A) > 0. All
modal reasoning takes place in GLPΛ.
For α = min (A), we use Lemma 4.15 to write A as Ak+1αAkα . . . A0 with
k ≥ 0 and each Ai ∈ Wα+1. Recall that A0α . . . A0 just means A0. By the
IH we find some A′i ∈Wα+1 such that A
′
lα . . . A
′
0 is in WNF and equivalent
to Akα . . . A0. Moreover, we have that l(A
′
lα . . . A
′
0) ≤ l(Akα . . . A0). It is
easy to see that we also have that αA′lα . . . A
′
0 is equivalent to αAkα . . . A0.
Again, by the IH, we can find some D ∈ W◦α+1 which is equivalent to
Ak+1 and with l(D) ≤ l(Ak+1). Clearly we have that
DαA′lα . . . A
′
0 ↔ D ∧ αA
′
lα . . . A
′
0
↔ Ak+1 ∧ αA
′
lα . . . A
′
0
↔ Ak+1 ∧ αAkα . . . A0
↔ A.
If A′l ≥α+1 D then DαA
′
lα . . . A
′
0 is in WNF. Moreover, l(DαA
′
lα . . . A
′
0) ≤
l(D)+l(αA′lα . . . A
′
0) ≤ l(Ak+1)+l(αAkα . . . A0) ≤ l(A) andDαA
′
lα . . . A
′
0 ∈
Wα.
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If A′l 6≥α+1 D we conclude by Lemma 4.8 that D >α+1 A
′
l. Now we can
apply Lemma 4.16 to see that
A ↔ DαA′lα . . . A
′
0
↔ DαA′lB
↔ DB.
We conclude by yet another call upon the IH to find a WNF inWα equivalent
to DB and of length at most l(DB).
Thus, tranforming a worm into an equivalent one in WNF boils down to
repeatedly shortening the original worm by applying lemmata 4.15 and 4.16
whence it is clear that mod(NF(A)) ⊆ mod(A).
Corollary 4.18. Given some GLPΛ worm A ∈Wα, there is a Λ-computable
procedure to obtain a worm A′ ∈ W◦α with mod(A
′) ⊆ mod(A) and GLPΛ ⊢
A↔ A′.
Proof. We see that the proof of Lemma 4.17 actually contains a description
of this decision procedure. In the inductive step, whether or not we have to
apply Lemma 4.16 can be Λ-decided in virtue of Corollary 4.11.
Now that we have seen that we can Λ-effectively compute a WNF, we
conclude from Corollary 4.14 that we can Λ-compute the conjunction of any
two worms A and B. In other words, we can omit the restriction that A
and B be in WNF in Corollary 4.14.
5 A normal form theorem for closed formulas
So far in this paper, no irreflexivity of the relations <α has been used in our
reasoning. In this section we shall prove that each closed formula is actually
equivalent in GLPΛ to a Boolean combination of worms and some important
corollaries thereof. In the proofs, irreflexivity plays an essential role.
5.1 Irreflexivity
By irreflexivity we mean the claim that for no A ∈W and for no α ∈ |Λ| do
we have GLPΛ 0 A→ 〈α〉A. In view of the following result, this is equivalent
to demanding that worms be consistent.
Lemma 5.1. If GLPΛ ⊢ A→ 〈α〉A, then GLPΛ ⊢ ¬A.
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Proof. If we assume GLPΛ ⊢ A→ 〈α〉A, then we would get by contraposition
and necessitation that GLPΛ ⊢ [α]([α]¬A → ¬A). One application of Lo¨b’s
axiom would yield ⊢ [α]¬A. Using the contraposition of our assumption
again, we obtain GLPΛ ⊢ ¬A.
Fortunately, irreflexivity does hold. This is known for well-ordered Λ,
in which case there are many arguments in the literature as to why that is,
each with its advantages and disadvantages.
Arithmetic interpretations. In case of GLPω all formulas ψ come with
a clearly defined arithmetical interpretation ψ⋆ where each [n] is interpreted
as a natural formalization of “provable in EA together all true Πn-sentences”
[20]. The soundness for this interpretation tells us that for any formula ϕ
and any interpretation ⋆ mapping propositional variables to sentences in the
language of arithmetic we have that GLPω ⊢ ϕ ⇒ PA ⊢ ϕ
⋆. In particular
we get for worms A that GLPω ⊢ ¬A ⇒ PA ⊢ ¬A
⋆. Now ¬A⋆ is just an
iteration of inconsistency assertions all of which are not provable by PA as
everything provable by PA is actually true. This reasoning, although using
quite some heavy machinery as reflection over PA, establishes the irreflex-
ivity of <n in GLPω. Recent work by the authors and Dashkov suggests
that this may be generalized to larger recursive ordinals than ω, however
arithmetic interpretations for non-recursive ordinals or for linear orders that
are not well-founded are not currently known.
Kripke semantics. Kripke semantics for GLPω have been studied exten-
sively [20, 22, 2, 18]. Using these semantics it is easy to see that for each
n ∈ ω, and each worm A ∈ GLPω we can find a model M and a world x of
M where both A and [n]¬A hold, thus establishing the irreflexivity of <n in
GLPω. More recently this has been extended to GLPΛ for an arbitrary ordi-
nal Λ [15]. One drawback is that the methods used are not strictly finitary,
whereas [2] gives a full finitary treatment of GLP0ω. Thus the irreflexivity of
GLPω can be proven on strictly finitary grounds. As before, the assumption
that Λ is well-ordered plays an important role and it is not obvious how
one could generalize these methods, however they do have the advantage of
working for arbitrary ordinals, including uncountable ones.
Topological semantics. The same reasoning can also be performed using
topological semantics of GLPω [19, 18, 1], which likewise have been general-
ized to arbitrary ordinals in [13]. As before, however, the methods used in
the transfinite setting are not strictly finitary and have been developed only
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for well-ordered Λ.
Now that we have provided a reduction from GLPΛ to GLPω in Theorem
3.2, we in particular have a reduction from GLP0Λ to GLP
0
ω. This gives us
a new proof of irreflexivity for the general logic. The present argument
is both the first finitary proof of irreflexivity for infinite orders different
from ω, provided that Λ (and hence GLPΛ) can be represented in a finitary
framework such as Primitive Recursive Arithmetic, as well as the first proof
of irreflexivity which does not require that Λ be well-founded.
Theorem 5.2. For each linear order Λ and each α ∈ |Λ|, the relation <α
is irreflexive on W.
Proof. The relation <n is known to be irreflexive over GLPω, and this fact
may be proven by finitary means [22, 2]. Moreover, if for some worm A we
had that GLPΛ ⊢ (A → 〈α〉A) = ψ, then we would have that GLPω ⊢ ψˆ,
contradicting the irreflexivity of <n for some n.
Thus, we have shown that <α is transitive and irreflexive and defines a
linear order on the worm normal forms in Wα. In fact, in [4] it has been
shown to be a well-order on Wα, if it is irreflexive and Λ is well-founded.
In particular, if we allow Λ to be the clas of all ordinals, there is a one-one
correspondence between normal forms in W and ordinals in On. In [17] the
relation <α is also studied and seen to be a non-tree-like partial well-order
on W.
Without using irreflexivity we proved two major results on worms and
WNFs. First, that WNFs are linearly ordered by <0, and second, that each
worm is equivalent to one in WNF. Using irreflexivity we readily see that the
WNFs actually form a strict linear order under <0 and that each formula is
equivalent to a unique WNF.
Lemma 5.3. Each worm A is equivalent in GLPΛ to a unique worm NF(A)
in WNF.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that A had over GLPΛtwo different WNFs
B and C. Then, by Lemma 4.8 and reasoning in GLPΛwe may assume that
B → 〈α〉C where α = min(A). Thus,
A → B
→ 〈α〉C
→ 〈α〉A,
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which contradicts irreflexivity.
Using irreflexivity it also immediate that our new definition of normal
forms is equivalent to the one previously used in the literature. In the
remainder of this paper we shall freely use irreflexivity.
5.2 Closed formulas and worms
In this section we shall show that each closed formula is equivalent to a
Boolean combination of worms. We follow Section 3 of [4] very closely,
formulating slightly stronger versions of the lemmata in [4] leading up to
important further observations.
The first lemma of this section in a sense tells us that whatever piece
of genuine information we add to a worm, this will always increase the
consistency strength of it (equivalently, increase the corresponding order-
type).
Lemma 5.4. Let A,A1, . . . AI ∈ Wα be such that for each i ≤ I, GLPΛ 0
A→ Ai. Then it follows that GLPΛ ⊢ A ∧
∨I
i=1Ai → 〈α〉A.
Proof. All modal reasoning will be in GLPΛ. By Corollary 4.13 for each i, let
Conj(A,Ai) be the worm in W
◦
α that is equivalent to A∧Ai. By Lemma 4.8
we can <α-compare Conj(A,Ai) to A. However, Conj(A,Ai) = A contradicts
0 A → Ai. Likewise, Conj(A,Ai) <α A contradicts the irreflexivity of <α.
We conclude that Conj(A,Ai) → 〈α〉A whence A ∧ Ai → 〈α〉A. As i was
arbitrary, we obtain A ∧
∨I
i=1Ai → 〈α〉A.
A direct and nice corollary to this lemma is that worms satisfy a certain
form of disjunction property.
Corollary 5.5. For A,Ai ∈W we have that
GLPΛ ⊢ A→
I∨
i=1
Ai ⇔ for some i ≤ I, GLPΛ ⊢ A→ Ai.
Proof. We reason about derivability in GLPΛ by contraposition and suppose
that for each i ≤ I, 0 A → Ai. Then, by Lemma 5.4 we obtain that
⊢ A ∧
∨I
i=1Ai → 〈0〉A. Irreflexivity of <0 imposes that 0 A →
∨I
i=1Ai, as
required.
Lemma 5.6. For A,A1, . . . Ak ∈Wα we have in GLPΛ that either
• 〈α〉(A ∧
∧
i ¬Ai)↔ 〈α〉A, or that
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• A ∧
∧
i ¬Ai ↔ ⊥ whence also 〈α〉(A ∧
∧
i ¬Ai)↔ ⊥.
Proof. All modal reasoning will concern GLPΛ. In case that for some i we
have that ⊢ A → Ai, clearly 〈α〉(A ∧
∧
i ¬Ai) ↔ ⊥. In case that for no i,
⊢ A→ Ai we apply Lemma 5.4:
[α](A→
∨
iAi) → [α](A→ (A ∧
∨
iAi)) by Lemma 5.4
→ [α](A→ 〈α〉A) by Lo¨b’s axiom
→ [α]¬A
→ [α](A→
∨
iAi)
Thus, [α](A→
∨
iAi)↔ [α]¬A, whence 〈α〉(A ∧
∧
i ¬Ai)↔ 〈α〉A.
Corollary 5.7. For any worm A ∈ W, and A1, . . . Ak ∈ Wα we have in
GLPΛ that either
• 〈α〉(A ∧
∧
i ¬Ai)↔ 〈α〉A, or that
• A ∧
∧
i ¬Ai ↔ ⊥ whence also 〈α〉(A ∧
∧
i ¬Ai)↔ ⊥.
Proof. We can split A into the largest prefix Aα of A that belongs toWα and
the remainder A<αof A. Consequently, A<α starts with a symbol smaller
than α or is empty and we have A = AαA<α ↔ Aα ∧A<α. Thus,
〈α〉(A ∧
∧
i ¬Ai) ↔ 〈α〉(Aα ∧A<α ∧
∧
i ¬Ai)
↔ A<α ∧ 〈α〉(Aα ∧
∧
i ¬Ai) first case of Lemma 5.6
↔ A<α ∧ 〈α〉Aα
↔ 〈α〉(Aα ∧A<α)
↔ 〈α〉A.
Note that in the second case of Lemma 5.6 we end up with ⊥ as desired.
Lemma 5.8. Let φ(A1, . . . , An) be a Boolean combination of the worms
A1, . . . , An. Then 〈α〉φ(A1, . . . , An) is equivalent in GLPΛ to some formula
Diamondα(φ) which is a disjunction of conjunctions of worms or negated
worms such that non-empty worms that are not negated have a first modality
α and non-empty worms that are negated have a first modality strictly less
than α. Moreover, we have that mod(Diamondα(φ)) ⊆ {α} ∪mod(φ).
Proof. All modal reasoning concerns GLPΛ. Any word Ai in φ(A1, . . . , An)
is equivalent to some Bi∧Ci where Bi ∈Wα and such that the first element
of Ci is less than α. Thus, φ(A1, . . . , An) is equivalent to some other Boolean
combination ψ(B1, . . . , Bn, C1, . . . , Cn) of the worms B1, . . . , Bn, C1, . . . , Cn.
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We write ψ in disjunctive normal form. In the remainder of this proof
we shall not be too precise in writing indices and subindices as the con-
text should make clear what is meant. As 〈α〉
∨
j χj ↔
∨
i〈α〉χj , it suf-
fices to prove the lemma for formulas of the form
∧
i±Di where each Di ∈
{B1, . . . , Bn, C1, . . . , Cn}. By Lemma 4.3 we see that
〈α〉
∧
i
±Di ↔
∧
j
±Ci ∧ 〈α〉
∧
k
±Bi.
As worms are closed under taking conjunctions, we can write
∧
k ±Bi of the
form B ∧
∧
l ¬Cl where each of B,Cl ∈Wα.
Now we can apply Lemma 5.6 to obtain 〈α〉
∧
k ±Bk ↔ 〈α〉B, and
〈α〉
∧
i
±Di ↔
∧
j
±Cj ∧ 〈α〉B.
All the positive worms in
∧
i±Ci can be moved as conjunctions under the
〈α〉 modality of 〈α〉B again to form a single worm as the conjunctions of all
those worms are equivalent to a single one.
Corollary 5.9. Each closed formula φ is equivalent in GLPΛ to a Boolean
combination BCW(φ) of worms such that mod(BCW(φ)) ⊆ mod(φ).
Proof. By induction on the complexity of ψ. The only interesting case is
〈α〉 which is taken care of by Lemma 5.8. Note that in principle BCW(φ)
need not be unique as, for example, one could consider various equivalent
disjunctive normal forms along the way of constructing BCW(φ).
Corollary 5.10. For each closed formula ψ of GLPΛ we can Λ-effectively
compute an GLPΛ-equivalent formula χ which is a Boolean combination of
worms such that mod(χ) ⊆ mod(φ).
Proof. By inspection of the proofs of Lemma 5.8 and Lemma 5.6 we can
retrieve a Λ-effective recipe. We use that we already know that we can
Λ-effectively compare two worms and compute their conjunction.
Corollary 5.11. For each consistent closed formula φ there is a worm A
with mod(A) = mod(φ) ∪ {0} so that GLPΛ ⊢ 〈0〉φ↔ A.
Moreover, GLP0Λ ⊢ 〈max(A)〉
l(A)⊤ → A.
Proof. Write φ in disjunctive normal form where the atoms are worms. As
〈0〉 distributes over our disjunction, to each disjunct we apply Lemma 5.6.
As ϕ was consistent, so is each of the disjuncts whence each disjunct is
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equivalent 〈0〉Ai for some worm Ai. Thus, we end up with a disjunction of
worms that start with a 〈0〉 modality. Corollary 4.12 tells us that there is a
‘minimal’ disjunct and thus we see that such a disjunction can actually be
replaced by a single disjunct.
By an easy proof similar to that of Lemma 4.15, we further see that
GLP0Λ ⊢ 〈max(A)〉
l(A)⊤ → A,
from which our second claim immediately follows.
Corollary 5.11 has an important consequence for the model theory of
GLP0Λ. This result is used in [13] to give a completeness proof for certain
models of the closed fragment. Namely, if we have a Kripke frame F such
that F |= GLP0Λ and we wish to check that GLP
0
Λ is moreover complete for
F, it suffices to check that F satisfies enough worms:
Corollary 5.12. Suppose F = 〈W, 〈Rξ〉ξ<Λ〉 is any Kripke frame such that
F |= GLP0Λ and, for all λ < Λ and n < ω, there is w ∈ W such that
F, w |= 〈λ〉n⊤.
Then, for every consistent closed formula φ there is w ∈ W such that
F, w |= φ.
If Λ is a limit ordinal, it suffices to consider n = 1.
Proof. Suppose that F, w |= 〈λ〉n⊤ for all n < ω and λ < Λ and φ is
consistent.
Then we have in particular that for some w ∈ W , F, v |= 〈maxφ〉l(φ)⊤,
so that by Corollary 5.11 we also have F, v |= 〈0〉φ. But then we have w
with v R0 w and F, w |= φ, i.e., φ is satisfied on F, as claimed.
If Λ is a limit ordinal we observe that
GLP0Λ ⊢ 〈maxφ+ 1〉⊤ → 〈maxφ〉
l(φ)⊤,
so we may choose v satisfying 〈maxφ+ 1〉⊤ instead.
Note that this corollary is here stated for Kripke semantics but actually
holds true for any reasonable notion of GLPΛ semantics.
6 Alternative axiomatizations
In [2] it was observed that one could simultaneously restrict Lo¨b’s axiom and
the monotonicity axiom 〈α〉φ→ 〈β〉φ for α ≥ β to worms and still obtain a
full axiomatization of GLP0ω. In this section we shall prove that we can also
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simultaneously restrict the axiom of negative introspection 〈α〉φ → [β]〈α〉φ
with α < β to worms and still obtain a full axiomatization of GLP0ω. In
order to prove this, we need to recall the decision procedure as exposed in
[4].
6.1 A decision procedure
Theorem 6.1. There is a Λ-effective decision procedure for GLP0Λ ⊢ φ.
Proof. We shall first outline a decision procedure and then see that this is
indeed effective. By Corollary 5.9 we know that each closed formula φ is
equivalent in GLPΛ to a Boolean combination of worms. We can write this
Boolean combination in conjunctive normal form and as worms are closed
under conjunctions, each conjunct can be written of the form Ai →
∨
j Bij
with each Ai and Bij in WNF. Let us call this the worm normal form and
we write WNF(ϕ).
The decision procedure is represented by the following scheme:
GLP0Λ ⊢ φ ⇔ GLP
0
Λ ⊢WNF(φ)
⇔ GLP0Λ ⊢
∧
i(Ai →
∨
j Bij)
⇔ ∀i GLP0Λ ⊢ Ai →
∨
j Bij by Lemma 5.5
⇔ ∀i∃j GLP0Λ ⊢ Ai → Bij
⇔ ∀i∃j GLP0Λ ⊢ Ai ↔ Ai ∧Bij by Lemma 5.3
and Corollary 4.13
⇔ mod(φ) ⊆ Λ and
∀i∃j NF(Ai) = NF(Ai ∧Bij)
The mod(φ) ⊆ Λ in the last line we have in virtue of our conservation result
as stated in 3.2. In order to see that the above equivalences yield a Λ-
effective decision procedure, there are three major things that we need to
check.
1. WNF(φ) can be Λ-effectively computed from a closed formula φ;
2. NF(A) can be Λ-effectively computed from a worm A;
3. The worm corresponding to A∧B can be Λ-effectively computed from
A and B.
But, Item 3 is just Corollary 4.14, Item 2 is just Corollary 4.18, and Item 1
follows directly from Corollary 5.10 and Corollary 4.14.
23
In practice we will always only be interested in notation systems that are
easy, say primitive recursive, for which the following corollary is relevant.
Corollary 6.2. For each effective ordinal Λ, there is an effective decision
procedure for GLP0Λ ⊢ φ.
In virtue of Theorem 3.2 we knew already that GLP0Λ has a very easy
reduction to GLP0ω where the latter is know tho be PSpace complete.
Corollary 6.3. If the ordering on Λ is decidable in poly-time, then the
computational complexity of GLP0Λ is PSpace complete.
Proof. Theorem 3.2, provides a poly-time reduction from GLP0Λ to GLP
0
ω.
Although the closed fragment for GL is decidable in PTime ([10]), Pakhomov
has shown ([23]) that the closed fragment of GLPω is PSpace complete.
6.2 Restricting to worms
We are now ready to prove the main theorem of this section. By w−GLP0
Λ
we denote the logic that is as GLP0Λ but the axioms
[α]([α]A→ A)→ [α]A
〈α〉A→ 〈β〉A α ≥ β
〈α〉A→ [β]〈α〉A α < β
restricted to worms A.
Theorem 6.4. The logics w−GLP0
Λ
and GLP0Λ prove the same set of theo-
rems.
Proof. We will first prove
〈α〉φ→ 〈β〉φ for α ≥ β and
〈α〉φ→ [β]〈α〉φ for α < β
for φ any closed formula within w−GLP0
Λ
. We write φ in disjunctive normal
form as
∨
i(Ai ∧
∧
j ¬Bij ∧
∧
k ¬Cik) where each Bij ∈ Wα and each Cik
starts with a modality smaller than α.
When 〈α〉φ ↔ ⊥ there is nothing to prove, so we may assume that
0 Ai → Bij and 0 Ai → Cik and use Corollary 5.7 to see that for each i we
have that
〈α〉(Ai ∧
∧
j ¬Bij ∧
∧
k ¬Cik) ↔ 〈α〉(Ai ∧
∧
j ¬Bij ∧
∧
k ¬Cik)
↔
∧
k ¬Cik ∧ 〈α〉(Ai ∧
∧
j ¬Bij)
↔
∧
k ¬Cik ∧ 〈α〉Ai
↔ 〈α〉(Ai ∧
∧
k ¬Cik).
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Let us first see that 〈α〉φ → 〈β〉φ for α ≥ β. We observe that Wα ⊂ Wβ.
We shall write
∧
k ¬Cik as
∧
k′ ¬Cik′ ∧
∧
l ¬Dil where the first modality in
each Cik′ is strictly below β and the first modality in each Dil is between β
and strictly below α.
〈α〉φ → 〈α〉
∨
i(Ai ∧
∧
j ¬Bij ∧
∧
k ¬Cik)
→
∨
i〈α〉(Ai ∧
∧
j ¬Bij ∧
∧
k ¬Cik)
→
∨
i(
∧
k ¬Cik ∧ 〈α〉(Ai ∧
∧
j ¬Bij))
→
∨
i(
∧
k ¬Cik ∧ 〈α〉Ai)
→
∨
i(
∧
k ¬Cik ∧ 〈β〉Ai)
→
∨
i(
∧
k′ ¬Cik′ ∧
∧
l ¬Dil ∧ 〈β〉Ai)
→
∨
i(
∧
k′ ¬Cik′ ∧ 〈β〉Ai)
→
∨
i〈β〉(Ai ∧
∧
k′ ¬Cik′)) As 0 Ai → Dil
→
∨
i〈β〉(Ai ∧
∧
j ¬Bij ∧
∧
k′ ¬Cik′ ∧
∧
l ¬Dil)
→ 〈β〉
∨
i(Ai ∧
∧
j ¬Bij ∧
∧
k′ ¬Cik′ ∧
∧
l ¬Dil)
→ 〈β〉φ.
For the proof of 〈α〉φ→ [β]〈α〉φ for α < β it clearly suffices to show for
each i that
〈α〉(Ai ∧
∧
j
¬Bij ∧
∧
k
¬Cik)→ [β]〈α〉
∨
i
(Ai ∧
∧
j
¬Bij ∧
∧
k
¬Cik).
To establish this we observe that ⊢ ¬Cik → [β]¬Cik and use large part of
our reasoning before:
〈α〉(Ai ∧
∧
j ¬Bij ∧
∧
k ¬Cik) →
∧
k ¬Cik ∧ 〈α〉Ai
→
∧
k ¬Cik ∧ [β]〈α〉Ai
→
∧
k[β]¬Cik ∧ [β]〈α〉Ai
→ [β](
∧
k ¬Cik) ∧ [β]〈α〉Ai
→ [β](
∧
k ¬Cik) ∧ [β]〈α〉(Ai ∧
∧
j ¬Bij)
→ [β](
∧
k ¬Cik ∧ 〈α〉(Ai ∧
∧
j ¬Bij))
→ [β]〈α〉(Ai ∧
∧
j ¬Bij ∧
∧
k ¬Cik)
→ [β]〈α〉
∨
i(Ai ∧
∧
j ¬Bij ∧
∧
k ¬Cik).
Giving an explicit proof for the full version of Lo¨b’s axiom from the
restricted ones seems to be rather involved thus we choose another proof
strategy.
We observe that the only (!) application of Lo¨b’s axiom in this paper
is in Lemma 5.6 where it is actually restricted to worms. Thus, with the
restricted version of Lo¨b’s axiom we come to the same decision procedure
and the same set of unique WNFs whence the two logics w−GLP0
Λ
and GLP0Λ
prove the same set of theorems.
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